Monarco v. Lo Greco by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
8-1-1950
Monarco v. Lo Greco
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Monarco v. Lo Greco 35 Cal.2d 621 (1950).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/591
) 
) 
Aug. 1950] MONARCO 11. Lo GRECO 
135 C.2d 621; 220 P.2d 737] 
621 
[L. A. Nos. 21024, 21025. In Bank. Aug. I, 1950.] 
CARMEN MONARCO, Appellant, v. CHRISTIE Lo GRECO 
et ai., as Executors, etc., Respondents. 
[1] 
(Two Cases.) 
Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel To Assert.-The doctrine of 
estoppel to plead the statute of frauds is not rendered 
inapplicable merely because a change of position, alle.,..-..ed to 
be ground for an estoppel, did not result from reliance on a . 
representation that a contract would be put in writing or that 
the statute would not be invoked. It is the promise that the 
contract will be performed, rather than such representation, 
on which a party relies when he changes his position, and 
the other party would be unjustly enriched by his acceptance of 
benefits under the contract whether his representations related 
to the requirements of the statute or were limited to affirma-
tions that the contract would be performed. 
Wills-Agreements Relating to Wills-Remedies.-Neither an 
action at law for damages for breach of contract nor the 
quasi-contractual remedy for value of services rendered is 
adequate for the breach of a contract to leave property by will 
in exchange for services of a peculiar nature involving the 
assumption or continuation of a close family relationship. 
Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel To Assert.-In a cross-action by 
testator's wife to impress a trust on property devised to plain-
tiff in violation of the testator's oral contract with crOSB-
complainant and her son that she and the testator were to 
hold the property in joint tenancy and that the survivor waa 
to devise it to her son in consideration of his services in the 
family business, she was entitled to seek enforcement of the 
contract and, as a third party beneficiary, to rely on the 
ele.ments of estoppel provided by the son's change of position in 
reliance on the contract and the testator's acceptance of bene-
fits thereunder. 
;~! . 
. . ' APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
'; ':Angeles County. Albert F. Ross, Judge.- Affirmed. 
}:l [1] Relation between estoppel to assert statute of frauds and 
part performance, notes, 75 A.L.R. 650; 101 A.L.R. 923; 117 A.L.& 
,.839. See, also, 10 Cal.Jur. 644; 12 CaLJur. 933; 49 Am.Jur. 888 . 
. [2] See 26 CaLJur. 831; 37 Am.Jur. 156. 
IIclt. Dig. References: [1, 3] Frauds, Statute of, 169; [2] 
,Wills, § 167. 
i,*Alaipecl b1 Chairman of Judicial Counc.il. 
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Actions for partition and an accounting, to which one 
defendant filed a cross-complaint asking that plaintiff be 
declared a constructive trustee. Judgment for defendants and 
cross-complainant, atlirmed. 
Allen M. Williams for Appellant. 
Oliver O. Clark and Jack R. Mills for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Natale and Carmela Castiglia were married 
in 1919 in Colorado. Carmela had three children, John, Rosie 
and Christie, by a previous marriage. Rosie was married to 
Nick Norcia. Natale had one grandchild, plaint.iff Carmen 
Monarco, the son of a deceased daughter by a previous 
marriage. Natale and Carmela moved to California where 
they invested their assets, amounting to approximately $4,000, 
in a half interest in agricultural property. Rosie and Nick 
Norcia acquired the other half interest. Christie, then in his 
early teens, moved with the family to California. Plaintiff 
remained in Colorado. In 1926, Christie, then 18 years old, 
decided to leave the home of his mother and stepfather and 
seek an independent living. Natale and Carmela, however, 
wanted him to stay with them and participate in the family 
venture. They made an oral proposal to Christie that if he 
stayed home and worked they would keep their property in 
joint tenancy so that it would pass to the survivor who would 
leave it to Christie by will except for small devises to John 
and Rosie. In performance of this agreement Christie re-
mained home and "worked "diligently "in the -family venture. 
He gave up any' opportunity for further education or any 
chance to accumulate property of his own. He received only 
his room and board and spending money. When he married 
and suggested the possibility of securing some present interest 
. to support his Wife, Natale told him that his wife should move 
. in with the family and that Christie need not worry, for he 
would receive all the property when Natale and Carmela died. 
Natale and Carmela placed all of their property in joint 
tenancy and in 1941 both executed wills leaving all their 
property to Christie with the exception of small devises to 
Rosie and John· and $500 to plaintitf. Although these wills 
did not refer to the agreement, their terms were agreed upon 
by Christie, Natale and Carmela. The venture was successful, 
10 that at the time of Natale's death his and Carmela's interest 
was worth approximately $100,000. Shortly before his death 
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Natale became dissatisfied with the agreement and determined 
to leave his half of the joint property to his grandson, the 
plaintiff. Without informing Christie or Carmela he arranged 
the necessary conveyances to terminate the joint tenancies and 
executed a will leaving all of his property to plaintiff. This 
will was probated and the court entered its decree distributing 
the property to plaintiff. After the decree of distribution 
became final, plaintiff brought these actions· for partition of 
the properties and an accounting. By cross-complaint Carmela 
asked that plaintiff be declared a constructive trustee of the 
property he received as a result of Natale's breach of his 
agreement to keep the property in joint tenancy. On the 
basis of the foregoing facts the trial court gave judgment for 
.. defendants and cross-complainant, and plaintiff has appealed . 
. The controlling question is whether plaintiff is estopped 
from relying upon the statute of frauds (Civ. Code § 1624; 
COde Civ. Proc. § 1973) to defeat the enforcement of the oral 
.. contract. The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute 
of· frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this 
stAte to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to 
. enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud 
may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result 
from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has 
induced by the other seriously to change his position in 
.&<;.LJ'~'"'' on the contract (Wilk v. Vencill, 30 CaL2d 104, 108 
[180 P.2d 351] ; Vierra v. Pereira, 12 Ca1.2d 629, 630-632 [86 
.. P.2d 8161; Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal.2d 416, 422 [65 P.2d 770] ; 
. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 796 [106 P. 88, 134 Am.St .. 
. 154] ; Kaye v. !tfelzer, 87 Cal.App.2d 299, 306 [197 P.2d 
Frey v. Oorbin, 84 Cal.App.2d 536, 540-541 [191 P.2d 
Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal.App.2d 282, 286 [188 P.2d 
; Beverly Ht"lls Nat. Bank ~ Tr, 00. v. Seres, 76 Cal.App. 
262 [172 P.2d 894J ; Sessions v. Southern Oal. Edison 
Cal.App.2d 611, 619-620 {ll8 P.2d 935]; Rutland, 
lfltf.lllltl,..rf.lt d7 00. v. Oooke, 44 Cal.App.2d 258, 263 [112 P.2d 
; Tuck v. Gudna.,on, 11 Cal.App.2d 626,631 [54 P.2d 88] ; 
HnJldr'nm. v. Mullen, 84 Cal.App. 1, 4-5 [257 P. 545J ; Rockhill 
~"",,.."'., .. 22 Cal.App. 367, 372 [134 P. 720]), or in the unjust 
;tml~icllmlmt that would result if a party who has received the 
involves the property in which Nick and Rosie Norcia 
interest. The other involves property that had been owned 
and Carmela only. Since the trial Carmela hal died and her 
have been substituted &8 parties in her stead. . 
) 
) 
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benefits of the other's performance were allowed to rely upon 
the statute. (Poster v. Maginnis, 89 Cal. 264, 267 [26 P. 828] ; 
Feeney v. Clapp, 126 Cal.App. 729, 733·734 [15 P.2d 178]; 
Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal.App. 414, 417·418 [262 P. 400] ; 
Heffernan v. Davis, 24 Cal.App. 295, 301 [140 P. 716] ; see 
also, Ako v. Kusnert, 12 Cal.2d 687, 690 [87 P.2d 358].) In 
many cases both elements are present. Thus not only may 
one party have so seriously changed his position in reliance 
upon, or in performance of, the contract that he would sutfer 
an unconscionable injury if it were not enforced, bllt the other 
may have reaped the benefits of the contract so that he would 
be unjustly enriched if he could escape its obligations. 
(Notten v. Mensing, 3 Ca1.2d 469, 476-477 [45 P.2d 198]; 
Tonini v. Ericcsen, 218 Cal. 43, 51-52 [21 P.2d 566]; Bandfo" 
v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 488-489; Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 
897,903 [198 P.2d 357] ; Tobola v. Wholey, 75 Cal.App.2d 351, 
357 [170 P.2d 952] ; Van Fossen v. Yager, 65 Cal.App.2d 591, 
597 [151 P.2d 14]; Honsberger v. Durfee, 55 Cal.App. 2d 68, 
72-73 [130 P.2d 189]; Pellerito v. Dragna, 41 Cal.App.2d 
85, 89·90 [105 P.2d 1011] ; Grant v. Long, 33 Cal.App.2d 725, 
739, 742 [92 P.2d 940] ; RundelZ v. McDonald, 62 Cal.App. 721, 
724-725 [217 P. 1082] ; PUnt v. Giguiere, 50 Cal.App. 314, 320 
[195 P. 85].) 
In this case both elements are present. In _ reliance on 
Natale's repeated assurances that he would receive the 
properly when Natale and Carmela died, Christie gave up 
any opportunity to accumulate property of his own and de-
voted his life to making the family venture a success. That 
. ' 
he would be seriously prejudiced by a -refusal toenforce..the _________ .. __ 
contract is _ m.ade clear by a comparison of his position with 
that of Rosie and Nick Norcia. Because the Norcias were able 
to make a small investment when the family venture was 
started, their interest, now worth approximately $100,000, has 
been protected. Christie, on the other hand, forbore from 
demanding any present interest in the venture in exchange 
for his labors on the assurance that Natale's and Carmela's 
interest would pass to him on their death. Had he invested 
money instead of labor in the venture on the same oral under-
standing, a resulting trust would have arisen in his favor. 
(Byers v. Doheny, 105 Cal.App. 484, 493-495 [287 P. 988]; 
see, Restatement, Trusts, § 454, comment J., illus. 12.) His 20 
years of labor should have equal effect. On the other hand, 
Natale reaped the benefits of the contract. He and his devisees 
would be unjustly enriched if the statute of frauds could l;Ml 
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invoked to relieve him from performance of his own obligations 
thereunder. 
[1] It is contended, however, that an estoppel to plead 
the statute of frauds can only arise when there have been 
representations with respect to the requirements of the statute 
indicating that a writing is not necessary or will be executed 
or that the statute will not be relied upon as a defense. This 
element was present in the leading case of Seymour v. Oelrichs, 
156 Cal. 782 [106 P. 88, 134 Am.St.Rep. 154J, and it is not 
surprising therefore that it has been listed as a requirement of 
, an estoppel in later cases that have held on their facts that 
there was or was not an estoppel. (See, e.g., Zellner v. Wass-
man, 184 Cal. 80, 87 [193 P. 84] ; Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal.App.2d 
171, 175 [112 P.2d 30] ; Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal.App. 244, 
246 [184 P. 954].) Those cases, however, that have refused to 
ftnd an estoppel have been cases where the court found either. 
that no unconscionable injury would result from refusing to 
enforce the oral contract (Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 87 
[193 P. 84] ; Smith v. Bliss,44 Cal.App.2d 171, 178 [112 P.2d 
30J; Little v. Union Oil Co., 73 Cal.App. 612, 621-622 [238 P. 
1066] ; Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal.App. 244, 247, 248 [184 
. P. 954 J ), or that the remedy of quant1lm meruit for services 
rendered was adequate. (Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal.App.2d 
380,385 [193 P.2d 81] ; De Mattos v. McGovern, 25 Cal.App.2d. 
429, 432 [77 P.2d 522] ; cl., Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 
586 [147 P. 259].) In those cases, however, where either an' 
lmconscionable injury or unjust enrichment would result from 
refusal to enforce the contract, the doctrine of estoppel has 
. ~en applied whether or not pI,intllf relied upon representa. 
, tions going to the requirements of the statute itself. (Wilson 
Bailey, 8 Cal.2d 416 {65 P.2d 770] ; Notten v. Mensing, 3 
469 [45 P.2d 198] ; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481; Ryan 
Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897 [198 P.2d 357] ; Prey v. Corbin, 
'Cal.App.2d 536 [191 P.2d 21J; Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 
--.-.r.r.2d 282 [188 P.2d 278]; Tobola v. Wholey, 75 Cal . 
.A.pp.2d 351 [170 P.2d 952]; Van Fossen v. Yager, 65 Cal. 
App.2d 591 [151 P.2d 14] ; Honsberger v. Durfee, 55 Cal.App. 
2d:~8 [130 P.2d 189] ; Sessions v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 
Cal..App.2d 611 [118 P.2d 935] ; Rutland, Edwards &: Co. 
· 'Cooke, 44 Cal.App.2d 258 [112 P.2d 287]; Pellerito v. 
"'rnn'Rlf. 41 Cal.App.2d 85 [105 P.2d 10111 ; Tuck v. Gudnason, 
'V .. ~ • .D.J~V."u 626 [54 P.2d 88] ; Feeney v. Clapp, 126 Cal. 
729 [15 P.2d 178]; Holstrom v. Mullen, 84 Cal.App. 1 
) 
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[257 P. 545]; Price v. Smith Mfg. Co., 53 Cal.App. 303 [200 
P. 53J ; Flint v. Giguiere, 50 Cal.App. 314 [195 P. 85].) Like-
wise in the case of partly performed oral contracts for the 
~le of land specific enforcement will be decreed whether or 
not there have been representations going to the requirements 
of the statute, because its denial would result in a fraud on the 
plaintiff who has gone into possession or made improvements 
in reliance on the contract. (Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 
318 [95 P. 154, 159] ; Foster v. Maginnis, 89 Cal. 264, 267 [26 
P. 8281; Rundell v. McDonald. 62 Cal.App. 721, 724 [217 P. 
1082] ; Stewart v. Smith, 6 Cal.App. 152, 160 [91 P. 667]; 
see, 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed. ] § 921, p. 618; 
4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.] § 1409, p. 1056; 
anno., 75 A.L.R. 650; anno., 101 A.L.R. 923, 935; anno., 117 
A.L.R. 939.) In reality it is not the representation that the 
contract will be put in writing or that the statute will not be 
invoked, but .the promise that the contract will be performed 
that a party relies upon when he changes his position because 
of it. Moreover, a party who has accepted the benefits of an 
oral contract will be unjustly enriched if the contract is not 
enforced whether his representations related to the require-
ments of the statute or were limited to affirmations that the 
contract would be performed. 
[2] It is settled that neither the remedy of an action at 
law for damages for breach of contract nor the quasi-
contractual remedy for the value of services rendered is 
adequate for the breach of a contract to leave property by 
will in exchange for services of a peculiar nature involving 
the assumption or continuation of a close family relationship. 
(Jones v. Clark, 19 Cal. 2d 156, 160 [119 P.2d 7311; Wolfsen 
v. Smyer, 178 Cal. 775, 782-783 [175 P. 10]; Baumann v. 
Kusian, 164 Cal. 582, 587-588 [129 P. 986,44 L.R.A.N.S. 756] ; 
McOabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 88-89 [70 P. 1008] ; Owens v. 
McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 450, 452 [45 P. 710, 33 L.R.A. 369].) 
The facts of this case clearly bring it within the foregoing 
rule. 
[3] It is contended, however, that since Christie is not a 
party to this action, his change of position in reliance on 
Natale's promises will not support Carmela's efforts to secure 
the benefits of the contract due to her. In this rpspect. plain-
tift' contends that defendants did not plead a contract for 
Christie's benefit but only one whereby Carmela was entitled 
to ownership as the surviving joint tenant. When the action 
was commenced, however, Carmela was the person entitled 
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to the property under the terms of the contract. It was 
therefore appropriate that she should be the one to seek ita 
enforcement. To the extent that Natale's pro:inise to keep 
the property in joint tenancy with Carmela was supported by 
the consideration of Christie's services, Carmela was a third 
party beneficiary of the agreement between Christie and 
Natale. She was entitled to rely upon the elemellta of estoppel 
provided by Christie's change of poaition in reliance on the 
contract and Natale's acceptance of tbe benefits. "[Ilt is the 
ch4nge of poaition of the contracting parties, and not the bene-
ficiaries of tbe contract, that forms the estoppel to rely upon 
the statute of frauds." (Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897, 
903 [198 P.2d 357}.} In this respect the present case is 
governed by Notten v. Mensing, 3 Ca1.2d 469 [45 P.2d 198}. 
In the Notten case a childless couple made an oral agreement 
that each would leave all his property to the other on the 
.condition that the survivor would leave it equally to the 
heirs of both. The husband died first leaving a will in 
accordance with the agreement. The wife accepted the bene-
fits thereby accruing to her. In breacb of her agreement, 
however, she left all her property to ber own heirs. In an 
action by the husband's heirs to impress a constructive trust on 
. the amount due them under the agreement it was held that 
.' 'the wife's heirs were estopped to plead the statute of fraud&. 
·.The baais of the estoppel was not anything done by the hus-
. 's heirs; but the husband's change in position ~ dying 
~~~out providing for his own heirs, a change in poaitiOJi made 
~evocable by the wife's acceptance of the benefits of the' 
.~eement. Likewise, Christie in reliance on the contract 
:'contributed his services for over 20 years to make the family 
hXI~nt1llre a success, and Natale accepted the benefits thereof. 
ir.~a1ntltf is thus estopped because of these facta just as were the 
heirs in the Nott~n case. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
UUIlSUJLl, C. J., Shenk, fJ.. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
,Spence J., concurred. 
